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ABSTRACT: Nowadays, firms are increasingly building collaborative relationships with their partners in order to 
improve the global performance of the supply chain in which they are involved. Such collaborative relationships 
require information exchange or share and negotiation. In this paper, we first formalize some practices of collaboration 
from case studies of the aeronautical area then suggest some models for negotiation, allowing a supply chain member 
to publish hidden constraints and share risks/costs in order to achieve a win-win situation. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
In collaborative supply chain, the conflicts between au-
tonomy and collaboration in one hand, local interest and 
global objectives in the other hand, are important prob-
lems the supply chain members are currently facing, 
especially when involved in multiple networks. Further-
more, the growing uncertainty on the customers' demand 
makes the supply chain harder to manage. In this con-
text, it is usually considered that an increased collabora-
tion is a good way to minimize the risks linked to this 
uncertainty (Hallikas et al., 2005). Firms are so building 
collaborative relationships with their supply chain part-
ners in order to achieve efficiency, flexibility, and com-
petitive advantages (Nyaga et al., 2010).  
 
We suggest in this communication a series of models of 
negotiation between customer and supplier, which helps 
to publish hidden constraints, synchronize internal and 
external interests and share risks with supply chain 
member in a context of collaborative relationships.  
2. COLLABORATIVE RELATIONSHIP IN A 
SUPPLY CHAIN 
Many studies suggest that collaborative relationships are 
associated with the improvement of the supply chain 
performance. Kalwani and Narayandas (1995) noted that 
manufacturers seek for long-term relationships with few-
er suppliers in order to secure valued resources and tech-
nologies, master supplier skills and strengths, and gain 
from quality and process improvements. Holland (1995) 
has shown that companies are moving towards collabo-
rative relationships in an effort to make the supply chain 
as a whole more competitive. Maloni and Benton (1997) 
suggest that it is essential for a firm’s survival to have 
collaborative relationships with its suppliers.  
 
 
Chung et al. (2005) express the idea that an interesting 
way to build an efficient supply chain is to integrate the 
supply chain activities by developing collaborative rela-
tionships between firms. Daugherty et al. (2006) found 
that firms engaged in collaborative relationships 
achieved improved visibility, higher service levels, in-
creased flexibility, greater end-customer satisfaction, and 
reduced cycle times.  
 
However, the real collaboration practices seem to be 
more complex to implement than considered in the lit-
erature. Considering practical cases, we have analyzed 
the behaviors resulting from collaborative relationships 
in the aeronautical industry. This study, along with asso-
ciated results, is described in the following. 
3. EXAMPLE OF PROBLEMS IN 
COLLABORATIVE RELATIONSHIPS: FROM 
THEORY TO REAL SITUATIONS 
The case studies considered here are based on projects 
launched within the federative structure IODE
1
, aiming 
at analyzing collaboration in supply chains, among 
which one performed with funding from an association 
of companies of the aeronautic sector and from a public 
body interested in SMEs development. The objective of 
the project was to analyze the problems linked to the 
collaboration between partners of aeronautical supply 
chains, especially when SMEs are involved. The people 
in charge of the relationship with customers and suppli-
ers of twenty companies have been interviewed in that 
purpose, the panel being composed of 7 large companies 
and 13 of middle (around 200 employees) or low (less 
than 100 employees) size. 
                                                            
1
 IODE is a group of researchers in Industrial Engineering in 
the South West of France (http://idce.enit.fr/iode/) 
 In a decentralized supply chain (e.g. when no central 
planning is performed), a cascade of ERP systems is 
usually considered as a mean to coordinate partners. 
MRPII (Manufacturing Resource Planning), the core 
production model of an ERP system, is usually used to 
perform and organize planning during supply and de-
mand processes, including sharing information at differ-
ent levels of operation plans and purchase orders.  
 
As seen in Figure 1, forecasts based on the expected cus-
tomer’s demand are built by the focal company of the 
chain (usually the final assembler in the aeronautical 
sector) then processed using the MRPII principles. After 
the MRP (Material Requirement Planning) step, planned 
orders/forecasts are grouped in a supply plan, sent to the 
tier (n+1) partners (see the left and middle side of the 
figure). 
 
Figure 1. Supply chain planning using a cascade of MRP 
processes 
 
When analyzing the implementation of these processes 
through interviews, some problems were identified, es-
pecially related with SMEs (see (Ming, 2011) and (Af-
fonso, 2008) for more details). In this paper, we will 
focus on some specific problems showing that real situa-
tions are more complex than the basic framework of 
Figure 1. The gaps, which are usually hidden, might lead 
to poor performance in the collaboration within the sup-
ply chain. 
• Problems linked to the firm period of the forecasts 
The first issue identified during the interviews is that the 
size of the firm period of the forecasts may be incon-
sistent with the supply lead times. As an example, a rela-
tive scarcity of some aeronautical alloys together with a 
lack of capacity of companies providing casting parts 
made that the supply time of raw materials increased up 
to 12 months in some cases. In spite of this, the firm 
period of the forecasts sent by the customer to their sup-
pliers remained constant, around 3 months, compelling 
the suppliers to take the risk to order materials on the 
base of flexible forecasts, or to be late if they were wait-
ing for confirmation of the corresponding orders.  
• Protection/pressure using the periods of the forecasts 
Some (rare) companies use the difference between the 
firm period received from their customers and the one 
they send to their suppliers as a way to protect their 
smallest partners, who may hardly deal with large varia-
tion of the demand.  
• Load smoothing at supplier's 
Load smoothing may be an important issue for SMEs, 
which have a limited capacity. During the periods of 
high load, some orders are often delayed while when the 
load is lower, SMEs are looking for work in order to get 
minimum incomes. 
• Protection against variations of load 
As seen in previous point, load smoothing can be per-
formed on the supplier's side but also by the customer: in 
some cases, this problem was formally taken into ac-
count by the customers willing to protect their smallest 
suppliers. 
• Link between price and cycle time 
Satisfying urgent orders is part of the daily work in aero-
nautical supply chains; it usually means spending extra 
money (due to extra hours, etc.) or postponing other or-
ders considered as less urgent, with the result of pertur-
bations in the planning. In some very specific cases, we 
have seen that the principle of a priority negotiation of 
the price and cycle time could be considered in order to 
address the problem of these urgencies. 
• Information sharing 
As already stated, many SMEs are facing a variable de-
mand that they can hardly satisfy at low cost. Even if 
some orders are not as urgent as others, this information 
is not often shared by the customer. As a consequence, 
the SMEs have to make their decisions (on the priority of 
orders, grouping of similar orders, adjustment of lot siz-
es, etc.) on the sole base of internal considerations. Some 
cases of customers sharing such type of information with 
their suppliers have nevertheless been noticed. 
• Lot sizes 
Lot size is an important item, negotiated in the contracts. 
Nevertheless, SMEs have to decrease their costs through 
time, and have so to find solutions for constantly increas-
ing the efficiency of their production system. In order to 
do this, most of them may need to provisionally increase 
their lot sizes. Therefore, many suppliers try to group 
various orders from their customers in order to decrease 
their set-ups. 
 
Looking back at the studies, important problems have 
been described in purchasing of raw material/component 
and on the delivery of the requirements. Therefore, we 
have especially focused on the aspects of the supply and 
demand process, such as period of forecasts, load varia-
tions, order priorities, lot sizes, or purchasing cycle 
times, which were the objects of many hidden practices, 
especially from the suppliers.  
Usually, “supplier development” is considered as a long-
term approach to deal with these problems, many cus-
tomers considering that they are the proof of a lack of 
maturity of their suppliers. In that purpose, many pro-
jects have been launched during the last five years aim-
ing for instance at disseminating the principles of MRP 
and lean management in the SMEs of the aeronautic sec-
tor.  
For us, practices are linked to actual needs, closely at-
tached to a type of relationship between supplier and 
customer, even if their result can be considered as nega-
tive. Therefore, we suggest to have a different attitude, 
and to consider that the practices of the suppliers, even if 
they may be unacceptable by their customers, are the 
symptoms of real problems. Therefore, we propose to 
turn these “hidden” practices into public ones, subject to 
negotiation with the partner. In order to illustrate this, we 
have focused on four points, detailed in next section.  
4. CONTEXT AND MODELS FOR SUPPLY 
CHAIN NEGOTIATION 
Our goal here is not to suggest a so-called “optimal” 
negotiation process, but to take some real empirical situ-
ations from case studies as examples, and try to include 
them into a consistent formal negotiation process, using 
Business Process Diagram (BPMN, 2011), in order to 
check their real potential. Therefore, the cases mentioned 
are not for us a closed list, but an illustration of what can 
be brought by extending the objects of the negotiation 
process, which may concern quite different aspects. In 
the proposed negotiation processes, we shall first consid-
er four items based on the case studies: periods of fore-
casts, load variation, price and cycle time, then order 
priority and lot sizes. 
 
4.1. Period of forecast  
In the aeronautical industry, the forecast usually consists 
of firm, flexible and free periods. As seen from the case 
studies, the problems are basically due to possible 
inconsistencies between the firm period and the cycle 
time of the orders, or the link between the lengths of the 
periods received by the customer and those he sends to 
his supplier.  
 
Normally, after building a S&OP (Sales and Operations 
Plan) and a MPS (Master Production Schedule) (points 
! and "), the supply plan, one of the outputs of MRP, 
is generated according to the contractual lengths of firm, 
flexible and free periods (point #). 
 
The supply plan is considered as forecasts by the 
supplier (point $). The supplier makes then his own 
MRP calculation (point %), allowing him to build his 
own supply plan (not mentioned in Fig. 2) and his load 
plan (point &). Having taken into account his cycle 
time and the one of his suppliers, the supplier is able to 
check whether this load plan is consistent or not, or in 
other terms whether he takes too much risks (for instance 
by ordering parts on the base of the flexible period of 
forecasts, point '). Depending on additional 
information on his customers and suppliers (such as “can 
they be urged or not? Do they have financial stability or 
not?”), he decides whether these risks are acceptable or 
not (point (). If he considers that he takes more risks 
than his partners (customers and suppliers), he may ask 
for negotiation (point )). Of course, the notion of 
"acceptable risk", should be defined with better 
accuracy, which has not been done here since it is hard 
to formalize whereas decision maker have usually a clear 
view on what is "acceptable" or not.  
 
The customer performs the same evaluation: he makes 
his assessment of both internal risks and risks he 
assumes to be on supplier’s side (point *). This 
assessment of course considers the received horizon of 
the firm period from his own customer, the horizon of 
the firm period he sends to his supplier, his internal cycle 
time and his supplier’s cycle time. It should also include 
his opinion on the cycle time from supplier’s suppliers, 
the real costs of his suppliers, etc. This information is 
usually only assessed, since it is seldom provided by the 
supplier. The risk taken by the customer somehow 
proportional to the difference between the horizon he 
receives and the horizon he sends. It can be different for 
each of his suppliers, since two different suppliers do not 
need the same protection, or in other terms do not 
deserve that the customer takes the same risk (it is for 
instance acceptable to take risks for protecting a critical 
supplier, but not a “common” one). Such assessment will 
provide a customer’s vision on the allocation of risks 
between him and his suppliers.  
The next step is to balance the customer’s own strength 
and its supplier’s strength and weakness, aiming at 
assessing the acceptability of the risks he takes (point 
+). For instance, the customer may consider that he 
should take lower risks if his supplier has more 
“strength” than him. Of course, this assessment is very 
subjective, but is indeed done daily in real situations, 
within less formalized processes. If, from customer’s 
vision, risks are not acceptable, he will request a 
negotiation process (point ,). Otherwise, the customer 
will accept the current plans (point -).  
 
Therefore, three triggers may launch negotiation: request 
from customer, request from supplier, and request from 
both customer and supplier. Surely, the visions of risks 
allocation and acceptability may be opposed at the 
customer and supplier side, mainly because a company 
knows his own problems much better than his partners’ 
and may so overestimate them. In any case, sharing real 
information instead of trying to assess the situation of 
one's partner could facilitate to reach a consensus, but 
would certainly lead to other problems linked for 
instance to confidentiality.  
After the negotiation process, a new agreed horizon will 
be integrated into the customer’s MRP plan.  
  
 
Figure 2. Business Process Diagram of period of forecast negotiation 
 
4.2. Load Variation 
In case of load variation, instead of considering that the 
supplier has to, or cannot answer to an overload if it is 
consistent with the contract, overloads (or lacks of loads) 
could also be negotiated.  
 
On the customer’s side, the negotiation on load variation 
is proposed after the MRP step has been performed (see 
the top part of Figure 3). After S&OP and MPS design, 
the customer begins the MRP calculation (point !). The 
customer may then consider the supply plan for each of 
his suppliers in order to identify high load variations (by 
comparing the load for current and previous periods) 
(point "). For dealing with high load variation, the 
flexibility of the mid-term capacity of the supplier is 
essential. Therefore, the customer has to estimate the 
mid-term capacity on the supplier’s side (point #), as 
well as the costs to manage such capacity (point $). As 
a consequence, additional information on the supplier’s 
capacity, including internal regular and overtime 
capacity, external accessible capacity (subcontracting 
capacity) (point %), and additional information of 
related costs (point &) are important inputs for this 
estimation. Depending on the closeness of the 
relationship, this information can be known or estimated.  
 
Based on the results, the customer needs to assess the 
feasibility of the load variation expected in the current 
period (point '). From the customer’s vision, if the 
supplier is capable to manage this load variation, the 
current plan is considered as feasible and the MRP result 
is accepted (point (). Otherwise, the customer requests 
a negotiation process, considering as doubtful the 
supplier’s capability to perform satisfied delivery when 
facing the considered load variation (point )).  
 
On the supplier’s side, the detection of the problem of 
capacity is not based on estimation, but on the actual 
capacity/load situation. According to the result of the 
load planning (point *), the supplier identifies a 
possible capacity problem (point +) and checks the 
feasibility (point ,) to address this problem (for 
instance, by extra hours or subcontracting in case of 
increase, by other solutions aiming at decreasing his 
capacity in case of decrease). Therefore, two important 
factors have to be taken into account: i) price paid by 
customer (point -) and ii) cost for extra capacity or 
decrease of capacity (point .).  
 
From the supplier’s vision, if the capacity change is 
considered as feasible, the current plans are accepted 
(point /). Otherwise, the supplier will request a 
negotiation process and communicate his capacity 
problems to the customer (point 0).  
 
Again, the negotiation process will be triggered either by 
a customer request, a supplier request or a double request 
(not considered here). Of course, if the problem is 
detected by one of the partners, the other has to agree on 
the fact that there is an actual problem. For instance, a 
customer may detect a high overload, which may have 
no consequence for a supplier, if other customers of this 
supplier have decreased their own orders during the 
same period.  
 
  
Figure 3. Business Process Diagram for load variation negotiation 
 
4.3. Price and Cycle Time 
Urgencies are detected at the customer’s side but they 
also have consequences for the supplier, challenged 
through his flexibility and adjustment of capacity. 
Therefore, we suggest to negotiate price and cycle time 
of urgent orders as the third item of our model. 
 
The negotiation on price and cycle time is considered 
here for a small number of urgent orders, see Figure 4. 
At the customer’s side, MRP calculation is based on 
S&OP and MPS, also taking into account the urgent 
orders sent by customer’s customer (point ! of Figure 
4), at a level consistent with their degree of anticipation. 
The results of the MRP step will provide a clear view on 
the material requirements induced by these urgent orders 
to the supplier (point "): they may have no effects on 
the current supply plan, or urgent material orders may be 
necessary. After load planning, the required due dates of 
the materials are confirmed (point #), then the 
customer needs to estimate the feasibility of urgent 
orders on supplier’s side (point $), as well as the 
possible extra cost for the supplier (point %). According 
to customer’s vision, if the urgent orders are considered 
as feasible, meaning that the supplier is supposed to be 
capable to deal with such urgency, the current plan is 
accepted (point &) and the urgent orders are sent to the 
supplier (point '). Otherwise, if the customer thinks 
that his supplier is not able to deal with these urgent 
orders (based on customer’s estimation), negotiation is 
requested (point (). 
 
At the supplier’s side, the urgent orders usually arrive at 
the load planning or detailed scheduling levels (point 
)). Based on the allocation of capacity/load towards 
each customer, the supplier needs to check whether it is 
feasible to deliver the urgent order(s) (point *) in the 
conditions required by the customer (including price) 
(point +). If the actual situation allows the supplier to 
adjust his capacity/load for fulfilling the urgent orders, 
the current plan is acceptable and the production process 
is launched (point ,). Otherwise, the supplier sends a 
request for negotiation (point -), and notifies his 
customer that delivery as requested is questionable in the 
present situation.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Business Process Diagram for price and cycle time negotiation 
 Therefore, three possible triggers launch the negotiation 
on price and cycle time of urgent orders: customer 
request, supplier request and double request from both 
customer and supplier. After negotiation on the urgent 
orders, the new agreed due date will be integrated in both 
customer and supplier’s plans (point ., /). 
 
4.4. Order priority and lot size 
The final item we suggest to put into the negotiation 
process is the orders priority and lot sizes. From the 
interviews, we have seen real cases where SMEs are 
trying to regroup orders having common features, 
usually in order to decrease the set-up times. On the 
other hand, if they do not have additional information to 
the due dates, it is common that the suppliers use an 
internal priority for scheduling the orders at the 
operational level if all the orders cannot be fulfilled in 
time, as well as when urgent orders are required. As a 
consequence, tardy orders towards one or several 
customers may occur. Temporal margins or safety stocks 
may allow the customer to face delayed delivery on 
some of the orders, but this information is not always 
shared with the suppliers. 
 
The negotiation on orders priority and lot sizes occurs at 
the operational levels is mainly related to constraints on 
capacity or cost (see Figure 5). At the customer’s side, 
depending on the lot sizing policy, the lot size is either 
an input (for instance, if an economical lot size has been 
defined) (point !) or a result (if a lot-for-lot policy is 
used) (point "). The customer may in the last case need 
to check whether the supplier’s constraints on lot sizes 
are consistent with his actual requirements (point #). If, 
from the customer’s point of view, no problem is 
expected, the current MRP calculation is acceptable and 
a load plan and detailed schedule can be performed 
(points $, %). If the customer considers that the 
current lot size is not feasible, due to the constraints of 
the supplier, a request for negotiation on lot size will be 
sent (point &). 
 
At the supplier’s side, there are two major tasks: one is 
to check the feasibility on lot sizes based on the results 
of the MRP calculation (point '); the other is to check 
the respect of the due dates based on the load planning 
and detailed scheduling (point ().  
 
In order to reduce the frequency of the set-ups, the 
suppliers usually regroup orders of similar parts coming 
from a single, or eventually from several, customers. As 
a consequence, the real production lot size may be larger 
than the contractual one with one customer, which may 
be necessary to meet acceptable prices. As seen during 
the interviews, these internal adjustments might 
occasionally result in early or delayed deliveries. 
Therefore, if the supplier considers that increasing the 
current contractual lot size could possibly lead to some 
benefits (point )), a request for negotiation on lot sizes 
can be sent to the customer (point *).  
 
Similarly, if it is not possible to meet all the due dates of 
the orders in process, instead of defining internal 
priorities linked to the importance of each customer 
(point +), the supplier can ask for a negotiation on the 
real priorities of the orders (point *), which would 
allow him to define a schedule possibly acceptable by all 
the customers.  
 
The negotiation process on lot sizes is launched by the 
customer’s request, supplier’s request or both, while 
problems on orders priorities are detected by the 
supplier. The corresponding negotiation process may so 
only be launched upon supplier’s request.  
 
 
Figure 5. Business Process Diagram for order priorities and lot sizes negotiations 
 
After the negotiation process, the new agreed lot sizes 
will be integrated into the MRP calculation of both cus-
tomer and supplier (points ,, -), and the order priori-
ties an input for the load planning and scheduling (points 
., /). It can be noticed that these two negotiations are 
quite different from the previous ones, since they may 
involve several customers at the same time, and would 
so be certainly more difficult to handle in practice. 
 
So far, we have introduced the suggested context of ne-
gotiation, which results are obviously linked to extra 
costs related with inventory, purchasing, capacity, etc. 
and the ways to compensate them. Back to the case stud-
ies, some practices provide us the primary idea of com-
pensable extra payment. In that purpose, it is necessary 
to define a cost model which bases are summarized in 
next section. 
 
5. ASSESSMENT OF THE MODELS FOR 
NEGOTIATION 
5.1. Extra cost assessment  
We have summarized the different costs present in the 
supply and demand process in Figure 5. We consider 
without loss of generalization that the buyer (customer) 
pays for the transportation of the goods (considering 
other solutions do not set into question the consistence of 
the framework). So, a supply chain member buys com-
ponents/materials from his suppliers, pays the material 
cost and transportation cost and stores the components 
into material (components) inventories before releasing 
production orders. As a consequence, purchasing costs 
include here the costs of the materials, of the transporta-
tion and of the inventories of raw materials/components 
(see Figure 5). If the supplier’s delivery is delayed, a 
penalty cost may be charged on this supplier, which de-
creases the purchasing cost of the customer. 
 
Considering the items that have to be negotiated (see 
section 4), it is important to include issues related to lot 
sizes and resource capacity in the cost model. Therefore, 
we have decided to describe the internal production costs 
then include the cost linked to the capacity of the used 
work center (using regular or extra-hours) or linked to 
sub-contracting, as well as set-up costs and finished 
product inventory carrying costs (see Figure 5). Penalty 
costs for delayed delivery (shortage) towards the cus-
tomer may also be included, due by the manufacturer. 
 
Each supply chain member, either supplier or customer, 
has the same total cost structure: purchasing costs and 
production costs, plus benefit, is equal to the sales reve-
nue.  
 
 
Figure 5. Suggested structure of total cost 
 
Using this structure of total cost, we can identify for 
each negotiable item the related elemental costs, which 
define the conditions of negotiation.  
 
A negotiation on the period of forecast on customer’s 
side is usually triggered by a request for an increased 
firm period sent by his supplier. In that case, the 
customer takes the risk to store parts delivered by the 
supplier, being unsure to really need them. As a 
consequence, there is a corresponding extra carrying 
cost, depending on the confirmation of his own 
customer’s demand. On supplier’s side, a request from 
the customer asking to decrease the firm period is 
usually received, with as a possible result, the necessity 
to order raw materials on the base of the flexible period 
of the forecasts, resulting in increased carrying costs if 
the expected demand is not confirmed. The related 
elementary costs are listed in Table 1. 
 
Extra Cost Related elementary costs 
Inventory cost Inventory carrying cost 
 Penalty cost 
 Purchasing cost 
Table 1. Elements for cost calculation in period of 
forecast negotiation 
 
During the negotiation of the load variation, the 
variables taken into account for extra cost assessment are 
different for the customer and the supplier, since load 
variation leads to problems of capacity at supplier’s side 
whereas they are linked with inventory levels at 
customer’s side. We have summarized the related costs 
in Table 2, distinguishing the customer side from 
supplier side.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Customer Side Supplier Side 
Extra Cost Extra Cost 
Cost of Inventory Variation Cost for Capacity Variation 
Related Variable Related Variable 
Inventory carrying cost 
Penalty cost 
Purchasing price 
Regular capacity cost 
Overtime capacity cost 
Subcontracting capacity cost 
Sales price 
Table 2. Elements for cost calculation in load variation negotiation 
 
Customer Side Supplier Side 
Extra Cost Extra Cost 
Cost for Managing Urgency Cost for Capacity Increase 
Related Elementary Costs Related Elementary Costs 
Penalty cost  
Purchasing price 
Regular capacity cost 
Overtime capacity cost 
Subcontracting capacity cost 
Sales price 
Table 3. Elements for cost calculation in price and cycle time negotiation 
 
Customer Side Supplier Side 
Extra Cost Extra Cost 
Cost for Increased Lot sizes Cost for Decreased lot sizes 
Related Elementary Costs Related Elementary Costs 
Inventory carrying cost 
Penalty cost 
Material cost 
Material transportation cost 
Purchasing cost 
Inventory carrying cost 
Set-up cost 
Material transportation cost 
Penalty cost 
Sales Price 
Table 4. Elements for cost calculation in order priorities and lot sizes negotiation 
 
Concerning urgent orders negotiation, at the supplier’s 
side, the extra costs are mainly concerning the possible 
increase of capacity required by the processing of the 
urgent orders, and eventually a cost for re-planning. At 
the customer’s side, the changes on the required delivery 
time depend on the slack time kept by the customer. 
There are two possibilities for assessing extra costs: i) 
the due date is mandatory, and an agreement has to be 
found on the price, ii) the due date can be negotiated, 
resulting in a lower increase of the price. Detailed costs 
are listed in Table 3. 
 
In the negotiation of order priority and lot size, at the 
supplier’s side, a so-called “optimal” manufacturing lot 
size is still often defined, depending on the set-up costs 
and inventory carrying cost (see for instance Wilson’s 
formula (Camisullis and Giard, 2008)). At the 
customer’s side, the purchasing lot size of the 
components depends on the delivery cost and inventory 
carrying cost. Indeed, deliveries in large quantities may 
be less expensive, but this is seldom the case in the 
aeronautic industry, quantities being relatively low and 
unitary prices, and consequently carrying costs, high. 
The elements allowing to calculate extra costs are listed 
in Table 4, showing considerations in lot sizes extra cost 
assessment, transport cost, back order cost and 
purchasing/sale price.  
 
The listed costs allow us to have a global view of the 
extra costs due to the suggested negotiation items. It is 
obvious that if customer and supplier reach a mutual 
agreement on the balance of these extra costs and the 
extra payment of compensation, the suggested 
negotiation processes become realistic. Therefore, the 
assessment of the extra costs, allowing cost/benefit and 
risk sharing between partners, is also considered as one 
of the main requirements for making this negotiation 
possible.  
 
Another constraint of our proposals is that such 
negotiations directly require the emphasis of 
collaborative relationships, mainly related with trust, 
maturity, power, dependency and goodwill, which are 
important factors for negotiation (Ming et al., 2012). We 
will focus on these in the next section.  
 
5.2. Collaborative relationship assessment  
The suggested negotiation processes aim at helping to 
increase the performance of relationship by turning hid-
den problems into negotiation items, which may lead to a 
better supply chain collaboration. Nevertheless, it is clear 
that making these processes realistic requires an inten-
sive exchange of information, including data usually 
considered as confidential, like internal lead time, capac-
ity or costs. Opportunistic behaviors, exaggerated con-
straints publishing, false information sharing, etc. are 
inevitably barriers towards our proposal. We try in next 
section to go give some basic ideas on the collaborative 
relationships that are in our opinion consistent with the 
negotiation framework we have suggested. 
5.2.1. Customer’s side 
 
In the customer’s point of view, if the customer distrusts 
or feels indifference towards his supplier, a strict execu-
tion of the contract is certainly the common way to per-
form cooperation in the supply chain. In our proposals, 
except for price, cycle time and lot sizes, the other sug-
gested items are usually fixed in contract. However, ne-
gotiation on these items needs a high level of trust. Even 
for urgent orders management, a complex issue which is 
often outside the terms of the contract, good perfor-
mance of negotiation on price and cycle time requires a 
long-term and better managed relationship, in which 
trust is a prerequisite. Thereby, we think that these nego-
tiations all require a trustful collaborative relationship.  
 
As mentioned, the four suggested negotiation items are 
based on hidden constraints seen in real practices. How-
ever, it is clear that dominated members have insufficient 
power to publish their constraints towards their custom-
er. Thereby, when the customers have a high power over 
the suppliers, the customer should be ready to launch the 
negotiation process as soon as he expects problems at his 
supplier's, in order to avoid hidden problems.  
5.2.2. Supplier’s side 
 
If the supplier distrusts or feels indifference towards his 
customer, the contract will be the base of the coopera-
tion, whereas a strict execution of the contract is in our 
opinion a barrier against a better collaboration and nego-
tiation on the occurring problems. Therefore, we also 
limit our suggested negotiation processes to the collabo-
rative relationships with high level of trust.  
 
Negotiation launched by the supplier is always aiming at 
publishing operational problems. As a consequence, 
when the changes/conflicts on the supplier’s side have 
critical impacts on the customer, in another term when 
the customer is dependent towards the supplier, we also 
suggest that the supplier should launch the negotiation 
process aiming at publishing real problems and then 
minimizing the following impacts through sharing 
risks/costs.  
 
As a brief synthesis, trustful collaborative relationships 
are the primary conditions for our suggested negotiation 
process. Depending on the allocation of power and de-
pendency, customers are suggested to launch the nego-
tiations in order to avoid potential problems, while sup-
pliers are encouraged to publish their real constraints.  
6. CONCLUSION 
The basic ideas contained in our proposal come from 
cases studies in the aeronautic industry. On the base of a 
comparison between expected behaviors and real ones in 
real supply chains, we have suggested to include 
unexpected practices, expressing in our opinion real 
problems, in negotiation processes. The context of these 
negotiation processes has been defined in details on four 
subjects: periods of forecast, load variation, price and 
cycle time, and order priority and lot sizes. These items 
are not a closed list of what can be negotiable but aim at 
providing examples of the fact that, paradoxically, taking 
into account the partner’s constraints may in some cases 
finally lead to a win-win situation.  
 
We have briefly presented the basic guidelines of a cost 
structure, which would be the basis of the negotiations. 
This cost structure is developed in (Ming, 2011) and 
examples of negotiation based on it are provided. The 
conclusions of the first tests are that, as expected, a win-
win situation may be the result of negotiation in some 
cases, under conditions which analysis is in progress. In 
order to automate the negotiation process in a realistic 
way, our perspectives are now to model the negotiation 
itself by game theory, more and more often considered 
for modeling customer/supplier relations in Supply 
Chains. 
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